Rated Average The United States places 17th in the developed world for education, according to a global report by education firm Pearson. Finland and South Korea, not surprisingly, top the list of 40 developed countries with the best education systems. Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore follow.
In the private sector, where firms are disciplined by market competition, it is usually assumed that resources are used effectively because firms would otherwise fail to profit.
Inefficiency leads to higher costs and higher prices—practically an invitation to competitors to lure away customers. But the relative lack of competition in the K education sector tends to dull the incentives to improve quality and restrain costs.
Moreover, in the public system, the ability of parents and students to ensure that they receive a high-quality education is constrained by the enormous obstacles to leaving a bad school.
If resources are to be used effectively, policies must create incentives that encourage school personnel to behave in ways that do not necessarily further their own interests.
For instance, without the right incentives, teachers may avoid using the most promising teaching strategies, preferring to use the techniques they find most convenient.
In terms of policy, one might speculate that if a nation assesses the performance of students with some sort of national exam and uses this information to monitor teachers, teachers will put aside their other interests and focus mainly on raising student achievement.
International Evidence This study asks two basic questions: Do policy and institutional variation help to explain variation in student performance? If so, which policies and institutions are most conducive to student performance?
To answer these questions, I turn to the international evidence on student achievement. This is because the institutions within a country do not vary enough to test how different institutions affect student achievement. Only the international evidence, which encompasses many education systems with a wide variety of institutional structures, has the potential to show which institutions heavily affect student performance.
My working hypothesis is that differences in educational institutions explain more of the international variation in student performance than differences in the resources nations devote to schooling. A large body of empirical evidence on the effects of resources on student achievement already exists.
It overwhelmingly shows that, at given spending levels, an increase in resources does not generally raise educational performance. Studies summarized by Eric Hanushek of the Hoover Institution have shown the lack of a strong, systematic relationship between resources and performance within the United States, within developing countries, and among countries.
Likewise, studies by Erich Gundlach and myself at the Kiel Institute of World Economics have found no systematic relationship between resources and performance across time within most countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD and within some countries in East Asia.
Data from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study TIMSS again show that differences from country to country in per-pupil spending do not help in understanding differences in educational performance. This means that school productivity, the ratio of educational performance to the level of spending, differs widely across schooling systems.
There is no consensus on the lack of a strong positive relationship between educational resources and performance, however. Still others point to controlled and quasi-controlled empirical experiments that have shown that more resources can lead to higher achievement. Notwithstanding this debate, the international variation in student performance levels in mathematics and science is a fact, and it is generally accepted that differences in the amount of resources given to the education sector do not fully explain why performance levels vary.
Data This study uses data from 39 countries to analyze how various institutions affect educational performance at the student level.
TIMSS is the latest, largest, and most extensive international student achievement test ever conducted. Inrepresentative samples of students in more than 40 countries were tested for various reasons, data files were available for only 39 countries for this study.
Countries participating in the study were required to administer tests to students in the middle-school years, but could choose whether or not to participate in the primary and final school years. This paper focuses on the middle-school years, where students enrolled in the two adjacent grades containing the largest proportion of year-old students 7th- and 8th-graders in most countries were tested.
This data set includes data on more thanindividual students, who form a representative sample of a population of more than 30 million students in the 39 countries. TIMSS contains student-level data on achievement and family background and various institutional data: Further country-level data on institutional features of the education system—mainly concerning the distribution of decision-making powers and the size of the private-schooling market—come from the OECD educational indicators.
I performed the analysis at the level of the individual student not the class, school, district, or country because this directly links student performance to the teaching environment. Previous international studies have used country-level data to analyze what influences student performance.
The trouble with performing the analysis at the individual level is that there are no independent, individual observations for many variables. Individual students who attend the same school may share some characteristics that are not captured by survey data; the individual observations are not wholly independent of one another.
For instance, in comparing students in countries with centralized exams with those with no centralized exams, there were only 39 independent observations the number of countries in the TIMSS sample.
Unless the econometric method is adjusted to account for the lack of variation in some of the independent variables, the findings will appear more robust than they are.Understanding the American Education System.
Updated: August 08, The American education system offers a rich field of choices for international students. There is such an array of schools, programs and locations that the choices may overwhelm students, even those from the U.S.
Graduate Education in the United States ; Services to. The purpose of education in other Greek city-states was to produce good citizens. In Sparta, the purpose was to produce a powerful army.
In all the Greek city-states, except for Sparta, the purpose of education was to produce good citizens. The cost of education in both countries is far from cheap, but the cost of an education in the United States is generally higher. According to a law passed in , universities in England may charge up to £ (approximately $14,) per year.
This study deals with five main institutional features of a nation’s educational system: 1) centralized exams; 2) the distribution of decision-making power between schools and their governing bodies; 3) the level of influence that teachers and teacher unions have on school policy; 4) the distribution of decision-making power among levels of government, from local to national; and 5) the extent of competition .
An Analysis and a Comparison of the Educational Systems in Vietnam and the United States PAGES 4. WORDS 1, View Full Essay. More essays like this: Not sure what I'd do without @Kibin - Alfredo Alvarez, student @ Miami University. Exactly what I needed. - Jenna Kraig, student @ UCLA.
In Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece, the comparison is discussed, " This system was radically different from just about anything we citizens of the twenty-first century know as a democracy. Even the few examples of direct democracy that have survived to be studied by modern scholars are comparable with the Athenian model in only elementary ways" (Raaflaub, Ober, and Wallace, 11).