In order to do this we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast, and make it shine forth so much the brighter. I omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they even conflict with it.
For as he does not as it were create himself, and does not come by the conception of himself a priori but empirically, it naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge even of himself only by the inner sense, and consequently only through the appearances of his nature and the way in which his consciousness is affected.
At the same time, beyond these characteristics of his own subject, made up of mere appearances, he must necessarily suppose something else as their basis, namely, his ego, whatever its characteristics in itself may be Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes himself from everything else, even from himself as affected by objects, and that is reason.
This being pure spontaneity is even elevated above the understanding.
For although the latter is a spontaneity and does not, like sense, merely contain intuitions that arise when we are affected by things and are therefore passiveyet it cannot produce from its activity any other conceptions than those which merely serve to bring the intuitions of sense under rules, and thereby to unite them in one consciousness, and without this use of the sensibility it could not think at all; whereas, on the contrary, reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what I call "ideas" [Ideal Conceptions] that it thereby far transcends everything that the sensibility can give it, and exhibits its most important function in distinguishing the world of sense from that of understanding, and thereby prescribing the limits of the understanding itself.This leaves a difficult interpretative task: just what is Kant’s general and positive account of reason?
This entry has the following structure.
The first section sets out the role that reason plays in Kant’s account of knowledge and metaphysics in the first Critique. In , the university was renamed Immanuel Kant State University of Russia. The name change was announced at a ceremony attended by President Vladimir Putin of Russia and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany, and the university formed a Kant Society, dedicated to the study of Kantianism.
happiness stills has a role to play in his ethics. In this essay I will discuss how happiness fits into Kant’s ethics. First, I will discuss Kant’s definitions of happiness. Second, I will explain his reasons for choosing a basis for morality other than happiness. Finally, I will illuminate the different roles that happiness plays in Kant’s ethics.
I. quotes from Immanuel Kant: 'Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be carved.', 'Tudo o que não puder contar como fez, não faça!', and 'A man shouldn’t claim to know even himself as he really is by knowing .
“The principle of private happiness, however, is the most objectionable, not merely because it is false, and experience contradicts the supposition that prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct, nor yet merely because it contributes nothing to the establishment of morality - since it is.
Kant's endeavor to locate morality in the domain of the understanding, rather than of the sensibility, has the dual object of universality and self-evidence. And although he is clearly scornful of the "moral sense" theory, he prefers it to a doctrine of "private happiness" in which moral principles are followed with the expectation of their being rewarded.